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With the UK economy seemingly back in
recession and national output still more
than 4% below its peak in 2008, where
next for the country’s elusive quest for
growth? John Van Reenen, director of the
Centre for Economic Performance (CEP),
has been prominent in recent debates
about the government’s austerity plan of
tax hikes and public spending cuts,
arguing that fiscal consolidation is being
implemented too deeply and too rapidly –
and is needlessly slowing growth.
He is also co-chair with Tim Besley of
the LSE Growth Commission, a major
initiative launched in January to inject
fresh thinking into the growth debate.
The commission will be holding a series
of evidence sessions over the coming
months, the proceedings of which will be
made publicly available as a permanent
record. And a report published by the
end of 2012 will articulate the
commission’s views on how to make a
sustainable improvement in the growth
performance of the UK economy.
In the meantime, the biggest social
cost of absent growth is of course
unemployment. That is the focus of our
cover story, which draws strong
implications for policy from the simple
insight that in a recession, people queue
for jobs, either literally or
metaphorically. Pascal Michaillat’s
analysis suggests that in recessions,
unemployment insurance should be
more generous and governments should
invest in infrastructure. What’s more, he
says, recessions are the wrong time to be
cutting public sector jobs.
Elsewhere in this CentrePiece are
reports on policy evaluations by CEP
researchers. One result is positive: Steve
Gibbons and colleagues think that the
‘pupil premium’ could improve the
educational outcomes of children from
low-income families. One is negative:
Ralf Martin and colleagues reveal the
failings of the climate change levy, which
aims to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. And one is mixed: Henry
Overman and colleagues find that
business support schemes can boost
employment but only in small firms and
at a cost in terms of productivity.
Finally, our last two articles are on
the topical issue of institutional investors
and their role in the performance of big
companies. One shows that publicly
quoted UK firms with higher levels of
institutional share ownership have a
stronger and more symmetric link
between shareholder returns and
executive pay. The other has good news
about the beneficial impact of
institutional investors on innovation.
Even before the LSE Growth Commission
reports, we know that innovation is a
key driver of growth.
Romesh Vaitilingam, Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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A
nyone who has watched
Charlie Chaplin’s film
Modern Times knows
that people queue for
jobs in recessions. In a
famous scene, Chaplin opens the
newspaper and learns that his old factory
is rehiring. He runs off to the factory
where he meets hundreds of people
seeking employment. The last one to
sneak through the gate, Chaplin gets a
job while many others are left queuing
outside the factory gates. 
The model of ‘equilibrium
unemployment’ developed by Peter
Diamond, Dale Mortensen and CEP’s
Christopher Pissarides – for which 
they were awarded the Nobel Prize in
2010 – provides a very appealing
description of the labour market because
it describes the creation of jobs by firms,
the search for vacant jobs by unemployed
workers and the process of matching 
firms with workers.
But the model seems inadequate to
describe the recessionary unemployment
of the Great Depression and more recent
times when the business cycle has 
turned down. The search model of
unemployment is inconsistent with the
existence of queues in recessions: it
converges to full employment when
unemployed workers devote an arbitrarily
large effort to search for jobs. In other
words, all unemployed workers could find
a job if they searched sufficiently. 
My research develops a model that
builds on the equilibrium unemployment
model, but which is consistent with the
existence of queues in recessions. In my
model, jobs are rationed in recessions so
that no amount of effort will allow all
workers to find a job. 
Unemployment is the sum of a
rationing component and a frictional
component. Rationing unemployment
measures the job shortage in the
economy. Frictional unemployment
The long queues of unemployed workers at
factory gates during the Great Depression
suggest that jobs are lacking in recessions,
irrespective of the amount of effort that 
the jobless put into searching for them.
Pascal Michaillat explains how this seemingly
simple insight has important implications 
for today’s economic policy debates.
Jobs in 
a recession
In recessions,
the labour
market
functions as a
rat race: forcing
people to
search harder
will not create
more jobs,
only more
competition in
the queues
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policy is unemployment insurance. We
often hear economists asking for
unemployment benefits to be lowered in
recessions. They argue that a reduction of
unemployment benefits would force
jobseekers to spend less time on the
couch and more time actively searching
for a job. As a result, they say,
unemployment would fall and the
economy would recover. 
They are probably right about the first
point that workers would spend more
time off the couch searching for a job. But
they are mistaken about the second point
that unemployment would fall because
they forget that people queue for jobs in
deep recessions. Once this feature is
incorporated into a model, unemployment
does not depend much on the efforts of
measures additional unemployment 
due to frictions in matching firms 
with workers.
The key feature of the model appears
in Figure 1, which plots a simulation of US
unemployment and its decomposition into
rationing unemployment (the blue area)
and frictional unemployment (the green
area). There is no rationing unemployment
in expansions, but there is as much as 8%
of rationing unemployment in deep
recessions. Frictional unemployment may
be as high as 5% in expansions, but it falls
well below 2% in deep recessions
(Michaillat, 2010).
Even though the labour market always
sees vast flows of jobs and workers and a
great deal of matching activity, recessions
– as in the early 1980s, the early 1990s
and the late 2000s – are periods of acute
job shortage during which matching
frictions have little influence on labour
market outcomes.
The intuition is simple once we think
about queues. In recessions the firm can
hire a new worker immediately, at no cost,
in the queue in front of the factory gates.
If the firm does not hire a new worker, it
is not because of recruiting costs but
because it would not know how to use an
extra worker. With this result in mind, we
can think about the design of economic
policies over the business cycle. 
When unemployment is high, a critical
Figure 1:
Rationing unemployment and frictional unemployment
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Unemployment insurance
should be more generous in
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jobseekers in recessions (even when the
economy has not reached the point where
queues form in front of factory gates). 
To understand how to design
unemployment insurance in a model
consistent with the existence of queues in
deep recessions, I collaborated with
Camille Landais and Emmanuel Saez.
Our main result is displayed in 
Figure 2, which plots the optimal
replacement rate – the amount transferred
to unemployed workers expressed as a
fraction of the income of employed
workers – as a function of the
unemployment rate. It is optimal to
increase the generosity of unemployment
insurance in recessions: the replacement
rate increases from 51% to 71% when
unemployment increases from 4% to 10%
(Landais et al, 2011).
Again, the intuition for this result is
simple once we think about queues. What
would happen if the government
drastically reduced unemployment benefits
in recessions? Perhaps unemployed
workers would spend eight hours a day in
job queues, instead of four hours in the
queue and four hours on the couch. 
This reduction in benefits implies that
there are now, say, 200 people instead of
100 people continuously queuing in front
of the factory gates.
But the larger number of applicants
does not matter for the firm. I have
already argued that if the firm does not
hire a new worker, it is not because of
recruiting costs but because it would not
know how to use an extra worker. While
lower unemployment benefits do make
unemployed workers poorer, they do not
reduce unemployment much. So reducing
unemployment insurance in recessions 
is undesirable.
Some will say that this argument
cannot possibly be correct. We
(economists) know that when an
unemployed worker loses his entitlement
to unemployment benefits, he finds a job
Figure 2:
Optimal unemployment insurance over the business cycle
Source: Landais et al (2011)
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much more rapidly than before. That is
true. Think about the queues. If you lose
your benefits, you will fight your way to
the gate and increase your chance of
getting the job when there is an opening.
But when you move up the queue, 
the workers that were in front of you 
are now behind you, and they move down
the queue. 
The labour market functions as a rat
race in recessions. Forcing people to
search harder will not increase the number
of people who find a job. It may only
change who finds a job. So it is not
desirable to make unemployed workers
poorer. It will not create more jobs, only
more competition in the queues.
Finally, fiscal policy may be useful to
reduce unemployment in recessions. One
common complaint about fiscal policy,
however, is that it may negatively affect
the private sector. These negative effects
may undo the possible beneficial effects 
of the policy.
For example, during the Great
Depression, US fiscal policy took the form
of public employment. President
Roosevelt’s administration hired millions 
of unemployed people to build dams,
bridges and roads. The goal of public
2.5
2
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■  Baseline
■  Public capital
■  Public sector wage
Figure 3:
Fiscal multipliers over the business cycle
Source: Michaillat (2012)
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less when it
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instead of in
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employment was to bring unemployed
workers back to work.
But the Roosevelt administration was
concerned that the public jobs created as
part of the New Deal might make it more
difficult for private firms to hire workers by
taking away job applicants. They thought
that if a mason were hired by the
government to work on a public building,
it could prevent a construction firm from
filling a vacant mason job. If each public
job displaced a private job, then it would
indeed be ineffective to resort to public
employment.
My research shows that while the
Roosevelt administration would be right to
worry about the displacement of private
jobs by public jobs in expansions, there is
barely any displacement in recessions.
Public employment is especially effective at
stimulating the economy at any time
when the labour market is depressed.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3,
which displays the increase in the
employment rate achieved by spending
1% of GDP on public employment. 
In the basic model (the black line), the
number of jobs created by public
employment increases nearly fourfold 
from 0.27 to 1.15 when the
unemployment rate increases from 4% to
10% (Michaillat, 2012).
The number of jobs created is larger
when public sector employees contribute
to improving infrastructure (the orange
line) because building public capital
improves productivity in the private sector,
which translates into higher private
employment in the future. The number is
also larger when public jobs pay
somewhat below private jobs (the green
line, which is obtained with a 5% wage
premium in the private sector).
These results suggest that the
Roosevelt administration responded
appropriately by hiring workers as part of
large infrastructure projects, and by paying
relief-job wages typically well below
private sector wages. 
The model is too simple to be the
basis for quantitative estimates of the
effects of actual fiscal policy interventions.
Nonetheless, it has some theoretical
features that could guide the design of
policies in recessions.
A first feature is that to maximise the
benefits to society as a whole,
unemployment insurance should be more
generous in recessions and less generous
in expansions. Another feature is that the
government disturbs private employers
much less when it hires workers in
recessions instead of in expansions.
An implication is that if the
government needs to conduct
infrastructure projects, it should plan to do
it in recessions instead of expansions to
avoid crowding out private employment.
Another implication is that if the
government needs to lay off public sector
employees, it should do it in expansions
instead of recessions so that public
employees who are laid off are able to
find a job rapidly in the private sector.
Pascal Michaillat is a lecturer in economics
at LSE and a research associate in CEP’s
labour markets programme. This article draws
on some of his recent research papers:
Pascal Michaillat (2010) ‘Do Matching
Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad
Times’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1024
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp1024.pdf) and forthcoming in the American
Economic Review, June 2012
Camille Landais, Pascal Michaillat and
Emmanuel Saez (2011) ‘Optimal
Unemployment Insurance over the Business
Cycle’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1078
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp1078.pdf)
Pascal Michaillat (2012) ‘Fiscal Multipliers
over the Business Cycle’, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 1115 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp1115.pdf)
If the government needs
to lay off public sector
employees, it should 
do it in expansions rather
than recessions
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A
common view is that the
performance of the UK
economy between 1997 and
2010 under Labour was very
weak and that the country’s current
economic problems are a consequence of
poor policies. In a recent report, we analyse
the historical performance of the UK
economy since 1997 compared with other
major advanced economies and with
performance prior to 1997, notably the years
of Conservative government, 1979-97. 
We focus on measures of business
performance, especially productivity
growth. This is a key economic indicator
since in the long run, productivity
determines material wellbeing – wages
and consumption. Productivity determines
the size of the ‘economic pie’ available to
the citizens of a country. GDP per person
is a function of productivity (say output
per employee) and the jobs market (the
percentage of the population employed).
The big picture
We conclude that relative to other major
industrialised countries, the UK’s
performance was good after 1997. 
The growth of GDP per capita – 1.42% a
year between 1997 and 2010 – was better
than in any of the other ‘G6’ countries:
Germany (1.26%), the United States
(1.22%), France (1.04%), Japan (0.52%)
and Italy (0.22%).
Figure 1 shows GDP per capita levels
in four countries relative to 1997. The
height of the line indicates the cumulative
growth: in 2010, the UK had a level of
GDP per capita 17% higher than in 1997;
over the same period, US GDP per capita
had grown by 14%.
The UK’s high GDP per capita growth
was driven by strong growth in
productivity (output per hour), which was
second only to the United States, and
good performance in the jobs market
(which was better than in the United
States). The UK’s relative economic
performance appears even better in the
years prior to 2008 before the Great
Recession engulfed the developed world. 
Growth and
productivity:
UK economic performance since 1997
After a century of decline in which 
UK productivity fell behind that of
France, Germany and the United States,
the last three decades have seen the
country catching up. A CEP report by 
Anna Valero and colleagues focuses on
performance during the Labour years
1997-2010 – and draws lessons for the
current government’s strategy for growth.
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But wasn’t it all a bubble?
The UK’s impressive productivity
performance relative to other countries
was a continuation of the trends during
the period of Conservative government
from 1979. This broke a pattern of relative
economic decline stretching back a
century or more.
UK GDP per capita fell relative to
France, Germany and the United States
from 1870 to 1979, but over the next three
decades this trend reversed. UK GDP per
capita was 23% above the United States in
1870 whereas the United States was 43%
ahead of the UK in 1979. By 2007, the UK
still lagged behind the United States, but
the gap had closed to 33%.
During the past 30 years, the UK has
had a faster catch-up of GDP per capita
with the United States under Labour than
under the Conservatives, although there
has been a slower rate of relative
improvement when the UK is compared
with France. 
But surely the growth of productivity
was all due to ‘unsustainable bubbles’ in
sectors such as finance, property and oil?’
Actually, the answer seems to be ‘no’. 
The expansion of property and the public
sector both actually held back aggregate
productivity. The financial sector
contributed only about 0.4% of the 2.8%
annual growth in the UK market economy
between 1997 and 2010.
Our analysis shows that the
productivity increases were mainly in
business services and distribution, and
they were generated through the
increased importance of skills and new
technologies. It is difficult to see how all
such activities could have been generated
by an artificial financial or property
bubble.
Analysis of other indicators of
business performance – such as
foreign direct investment, innovation,
entrepreneurship and skills –
supports our view that the gains
in productivity were largely real
rather than a statistical artefact.
This points to a more
positive reading of the supply
side of the economy than the
current consensus. Although
the UK still has some
longstanding issues in terms of
lower investment relative to
other G6 economies (especially in
R&D and vocational skills), things
have improved.
Figure 1:
Trends in GDP per capita 1979-2010 (relative to 1997)
30%
20%
10%
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-30%
-40%
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■  UK
■  United States
■  Germany
■  France
UK economic
performance
under Labour
continued 
the trend
improvement
under the
previous
Conservative
government
Notes: The analysis is based on OECD data (with Germany dropped before 1997 due to
reunification). GDP is measured in US dollars at constant prices and constant PPPs, using the
OECD base year of 2005. The working age population data are from the US Bureau of Labor
Force Statistics. For each country the logged series is set to zero in 1997, so the level of the line in
any year indicates the cumulative growth rate (for example, a value of 0.1 in 2001 indicates that
the series grew by exp(0.1)-1=11% between 1997 and 2001). The steeper the slope of the line, the
faster growth was over that period.
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Did Labour’s policies have
any positive influence?
Some have argued that Labour simply
enjoyed a ‘free ride’ on the radicalism of
Mrs Thatcher. Most analysis suggests that
freeing up the labour market through
breaking union militancy, removing
subsidies for ‘lame ducks’ and
implementing privatisation, lower marginal
tax rates and cuts in benefits all boosted
performance after 1979. On this line of
argument, the best that could be said is
that at least Labour did not return to the
failed pro-union, anti-competitive policies
of the 1970s. 
But the ‘at least Labour didn’t mess it
up’ argument is not compelling. It is hard
to believe that the Thatcher reforms
permanently kept productivity growth
higher for the next 15 years. The anti-
union policies may have raised output, for
example, but it stretches credulity to think
that they kept the UK on a permanently
better path of productivity growth.
We believe that it is more likely that
some policies of the Labour government
drove some of the productivity
improvement. In particular, the
strengthening of competition policy and
utility regulation, the support for
innovation and the expansion of university
education played a positive role. It is
possible that immigration may have also
played a positive role.
Establishing the exact magnitude of
the causal impact of these policies is
difficult, and the need for proper
quantitative policy evaluation remains as
strong as ever. Unfortunately, Labour’s
rhetoric of ‘evidence-based policy’ often
did not work out in practice. As with the
present government, there was too much
‘policy-based evidence’.
The policy area where Labour clearly
failed was financial regulation. In addition,
and more clearly with hindsight, public
debt was allowed to rise higher than it
should have done. Although these factors
did not drive the boom and did not cause
the global recession by themselves, the UK
economy was more vulnerable to the
recession than it should have been.
Does the Great Recession
change everything?
Does the experience of the recession since
2008 show that the productivity
improvements to the supply side since
1997 were illusory? We have argued ‘no’
Policies based on
an excessively
pessimistic view
of potential
output can lead
to needlessly
slow growth
as the 1997-2010 improvements were real
and not due to the bubble sectors of
finance, property and oil. But how much
did the financial crisis permanently reduce
the rate and level of productivity growth?
The extreme version of the ‘supply-
side pessimism’ argument is that because
the recession was caused by a banking
crisis, the fall in potential output has been
so severe that the UK’s output gap (the
difference between actual and potential
GDP) is now close to zero and productivity
growth will be permanently lower.
Pessimists point to the 7% fall in GDP and
slower growth from the trough of the
2009 recession.
It is likely that the recession has
caused some permanent fall in output
compared with what it would have been
without a deep downturn. But there is
huge uncertainty over the size of the
output gap. An alternative explanation to
a supply shock that has permanently
reduced the level and growth rate of
potential output is simply that global
demand is muted. 
Productivity
increases under
Labour were
mainly in
business services
and distribution,
not finance and
property bubbles
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A strategy for 
long-run growth
Whatever view is taken on shorter-term
policies, all sides agree on the need to
focus on longer-term growth. The 
report draws out some of the lessons 
from our analysis for how to restore
longer-term growth.
The structural improvement in the UK’s
relative performance since 1979 contains
the lesson that getting the market
environment right is key: strong product
market competition, openness to foreign
investment, flexible labour markets, a
welfare to work system and smart
regulation are major factors in promoting
growth. Government has a role in all of
this, setting the rules, and it also needs to
be pro-active in building human capital
and infrastructure and supporting
innovation. 
Our report argues that a growth
strategy must go beyond the
‘laundry list’ approach as policies
interact with each other and
efforts must be focused. We
sketch a plan for a ‘V-shaped’
recovery that requires the state and
civil society to scan the global
economy for potential
growth in demand, and then
focus on areas where the UK
has actual or latent
comparative advantage.
Within this space, there has to be
relentless scrutiny of where the state is
hindering and where it could help. A
specific example is higher education, a
globally growing sector in which the UK
has comparative advantage as witnessed
by the country’s strong science base and
high share of the market for overseas
students (who count as service exports).
Restricting immigration is hugely
damaging to this sector.
More generally, growth policies could
include supporting sector-specific skills,
access to credit for small enterprises and
innovation in key industries such as
software and healthcare. We offer less of
a blueprint for growth than a way of
thinking about growth that could form the
basis for economic revival. 
Three considerations point in a
more optimistic direction. First, the pre-
2008 productivity growth rate suggests
that the supply side made real
improvements before the crisis. 
Second, the fall in productivity
between 2008 and 2011 is broad-based
and not all due to specific sectors such
as finance and oil (just as the 1997-
2008 productivity growth rates were not
dominated by these sectors).
Third, wage growth remains very
low, consistent with substantial spare
capacity in the economy.
We worry that policies based 
on an excessively pessimistic view of
potential output can lead to needlessly
slow economic growth. Indeed,
pessimism over the state of the supply
side can become self-fulfilling as 
ever-larger austerity programmes cause
excess scrapping of human and 
physical capital.
Policies in the short to
medium run: to Plan B or 
not to Plan B?
The current ‘Plan A’ for the UK
economy is a period of very strong
fiscal consolidation – spending cuts and
tax rises to eliminate the structural
public sector deficit in the life of this
Parliament.
An alternative Plan B would be to
slow down the pace of the fiscal
consolidation. If the output gap were
near zero, then Plan B would simply
increase inflation, so the fact that we
think there is a good chance of a
substantial output gap implies the
possibility of a Plan B. 
The desirability of a Plan B would
be muted if monetary policy was
sufficient, if fiscal policy was ineffective
in an open economy like the UK, if any
increase in public spending or tax cuts
was irreversible or if markets would
panic at any retreat from Plan A. 
Our report considers these
problems, but does not find them
overwhelming objections. We argue
that we do indeed need a medium-
term plan for debt reduction but this
does not have to be done at the
current speed when the advanced
world economy is so fragile. Thus we
need a short-term stimulus 
(‘Plan B’) and a long-term growth 
strategy (‘Plan V’).
This article summarises ‘UK Economic
Performance Since 1997: Growth, Productivity
and Jobs’ by Dan Corry, Anna Valero and John
Van Reenen, CEP Special Paper No. 24
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
special/cepsp24.pdf).
Dan Corry, chief executive of New
Philanthropy Capital, was head of the
Number 10 Policy Unit, 2007-10. Anna Valero
is an occasional research assistant in CEP’s
productivity and innovation programme.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP and 
co-chair with Tim Besley of the LSE Growth
Commission, which will report at the end 
of the year on policies to boost sustainable
UK growth.
Getting the market
environment right is key for
promoting long-run growth
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The question of whether there is a link between school
resources and pupil outcomes is very important at a time
of public spending cuts. In education, these cuts are
arising because nominal expenditure on almost everything
has been frozen while inflation is rising. The one
exception is the government’s ‘pupil premium’ policy,
which pays schools a specific sum of money for each child
from an economically disadvantaged background – as
measured by whether they are eligible to receive free
school meals. 
The amount is currently £430 per disadvantaged pupil and
it is set to rise to £600 in 2012/13. Because only 17% of
pupils are eligible to receive free school meals, this does
not work out as a large amount on average. But while it is
not enough to outweigh the effects of inflation on overall
school expenditure (which is falling in real terms), it has
important distributional consequences for how resources
are allocated between schools.
Our research looks at whether changes to schools’
resources really make much difference to pupil
achievement, as measured by key stage tests at the end of
primary school. We are able to do this because of a quirk
in the national funding formula.
This quirk is related to the ‘area cost adjustment’, which is
intended to compensate for differences in the costs of
Urban schools:
does money make a difference?
It might seem self-evident that a school’s resources influence its pupils’
educational outcomes, yet so many studies have found little association
between greater funding and improved academic achievement. Steve Gibbons
and colleagues examine whether money makes a difference in the context of
urban primary schools in England.
in brief...
Cuts to school funding are
likely to have negative
consequences for pupils’
academic achievement
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employing teachers between local authorities. In reality,
however, closely neighbouring schools in adjacent local
authorities are not recruiting in different labour markets,
and their teachers are paid according to national pay
scales that do not correspond to the area cost
adjustments.
The result is that schools that are just yards apart on either
side of a local authority boundary can get very different
levels of funding. This has led to various local campaigns
against the perceived unfairness of the arrangements – for
example, the ‘fair deal for Haringey schools’ campaign.
For research purposes, the arrangements are useful
because they make it possible for us to compare schools
that are similar in every respect except for differences in
school funding. 
We evaluate whether schools with different levels of
expenditure (arising from the funding anomaly) have
different outcomes in national tests in English, maths and
science at the end of primary school (key stage 2 tests).
The analysis is carried out using the National Pupil
Database (a census of all pupils in state schools) between
2004 and 2009. 
Since our strategy relies on schools being near a local
authority boundary, the schools in our sample tend to be
in urban areas with a higher than average intake of
disadvantaged pupils. Our research design ensures that
the schools we are comparing on either side of the local
authority boundary really are similar. We only compare
community schools with a similar level of disadvantage 
(as measured by the intake of pupils eligible to receive 
free school meals) that are within 2km of the comparison
school (on the other side of the boundary).
We also check that the schools look similar in other
respects – for example, their ethnic mix, the proportion 
of pupils who speak English as a first language, school
size and neighbourhood house prices – and that pupils 
are not moving across boundaries in response to funding
differences between schools. All our checks suggest 
that the methodological design is appropriate for
measuring the true causal impact of the funding
differences between schools. 
The results show large effects of expenditure on
educational attainment at the end of primary school. 
They suggest that an additional £1,000 per pupil paid to
schools in these urban areas (close to local authority
borders) raises pupil test scores at key stage 2 significantly.
The effect is equivalent to moving one in five pupils
currently achieving level 4 in maths (the target grade) to
level 5 (the top grade) and just under a third of pupils
currently at level 3 in maths to level 4.
The effects of expenditure also tend to be higher in
schools with more disadvantaged pupils. These effects are
large. They suggest that cuts to funding in schools will
have consequences for pupils’ academic achievement.
More positively, they suggest that the pupil premium
could have a very beneficial effect and will help to close
the performance gap for schools that enrol high shares of
pupils from low-income families.
We cannot use this analysis to say what types of
expenditure are more or less effective for raising pupil
achievement. But we provide some insights by looking at
how the overall funding differences affect spending in
various categories. 
We find that additional income tends to get spent
disproportionately on items other than teaching costs (the
biggest item), with small increases in the shares spent on
learning and computer resources, professional services and
supplies. This might be because small expenditure
differentials cannot easily be used to employ additional
teachers and the inflexibility of pay structures limits any
pay for performance. 
The main insight of our analysis is that funding matters
considerably more than analysts and media commentators
often suggest. We should be concerned about the
consequences of cuts to real expenditure in state schools.
Local campaigners have also been right to raise concerns
about school funding inequalities generated by the area
cost adjustment in the national formula.
This article summarises ‘Does Additional Spending Help Urban
Schools? An Evaluation Using Boundary Discontinuities’ by Steve
Gibbons, Sandra McNally and Martina Viarengo, Centre for the Study of
the Economics of Education Discussion Paper No. 128
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/ceedps/ceedp128.pdf).
Steve Gibbons is research director of the Spatial Economics Research
Centre (SERC), reader in economic geography at LSE and a research
associate in CEP’s education and skills programme. Sandra McNally is
director of CEP’s education and skills programme and professor of
economics at the University of Surrey. Martina Viarengo, an assistant
professor at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, is a research associate in
CEP’s education and skills programme.
More discussion of this study is on the SERC blog:
http://spatial-economics.blogspot.com/2011/09/
urban-schools-more-money-better.html
The pupil premium 
could close the
performance gap for
schools with lots 
of pupils from 
low-income families
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The number of non-native speakers of English in primary
schools in England has increased by a third over the past
10 years. Now, roughly one in nine children between the
ages of 5 and 11 do not speak English as a first language.
A significant driver of this change has been immigration,
though the trend has also been influenced by higher birth
rates among ethnic minority groups.
The change has led some commentators to fear that the
impact might be detrimental to the educational
attainment of native English speakers. They fear that
teachers’ time will be taken up giving extra help to
children who do not speak English as a first language.
Yet several studies have shown that first and second
generation immigrants are, on average, better educated
than the native population. This suggests that there might
be things about the children of immigrants – such as
having better educated parents – that can compensate for
any lack of language fluency at an early age. In that case,
native English speakers would not necessarily suffer from
having such children as their peers.
Our research analyses a census of all children in English
schools – the National Pupil Database – to explore these
issues. We look at whether there is an
association between the proportion of
non-native English speakers in a year group and the
educational attainment of native English speakers at the
end of primary school – and whether it can be interpreted
as a causal relationship.
We also split the data into white and non-white non-
native speakers to see if there might be different effects.
Although the latter group is more important numerically,
the former has grown very sharply after the eastern
enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2005.
We find that there is a modest negative correlation in the
raw data between the educational attainment of native
English speakers and the proportion of non-native
Language barriers? The impact
of non-native English 
speakers in the classroom
The number of primary school pupils in England who do not speak English
as a first language has been growing in recent years. Sandra McNally and
colleagues examine whether this is damaging the educational outcomes of
native English speakers.
in brief...
The growing proportion 
of non-native English
speakers in primary
schools is not detrimental
to the educational
attainment of native
English speakers
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speakers in their year group. This correlation is halved
once the demographic characteristics of native English
speakers have been controlled for. It disappears altogether
once the type of school attended by non-native English
speakers has been controlled for.
This means that the negative correlation in the raw data
reflects the fact that non-native English speakers typically
attend schools with more disadvantaged native speakers.
Once this fact has been taken into account, there is zero
association between their presence in greater numbers
and the educational attainment of their native English-
speaking peers.
This result also holds true for younger cohorts (age 7
instead of age 11) and when looking at the number of
languages spoken in the year group instead of the
percentage of non-native English speakers. We explore
many different aspects of heterogeneity, for example,
looking at native English speakers who are disadvantaged,
who are of low ability and who are based in London.
We also divide non-native English speakers into those who
appeared in the school census in the last two years of
primary school versus those who were in the school census
before that time. This affects the raw association between
the percentage of non-native English speakers and the
educational attainment of native English speakers. But
once demographics of native speakers and school controls
are added, the effects go to zero in almost every case.
Under certain assumptions, our estimates can be
interpreted as reflecting a causal relationship. While we
cannot fully test these assumptions, our analysis strongly
suggests that negative causal effects of non-native English
speakers on the educational attainment of native English
speakers can be ruled out.
We also use another research strategy to look at the
relationship between the percentage of white non-native
English speakers and the educational attainment of native
English speakers. This strategy uses the fact that the
number of white non-native English speakers grew
dramatically after the EU’s eastern enlargement in 2005.
Since many of the new immigrants were Polish (and likely
to be Catholic), there was a big rise in the demand 
for Catholic schooling. The data show a much larger
increase in the percentage of white non-native English
speakers in (state) Catholic schools after 2005 compared
with other schools.
We use this as a ‘natural experiment’ to see if there were
consequences for the relative educational attainment of
native English speakers in Catholic schools. The results for
reading and writing show no clear impact, but there is
some evidence for a small, positive effect in the case of
maths. In other words, native English speakers at 
Catholic schools that saw a strong relative increase in
white non-native speakers benefited to a small extent in
their maths results.
We can only speculate as to the possible reasons for this
result. It may be the fact that immigrants from East
European countries are better educated and more
attached to the labour market than the native population.
The children of such immigrants may be a welcome
influence in the schools they attend. 
The two different research strategies apply to different
populations. The first shows associations that are
applicable to all schoolchildren. The second – making use
of eastern enlargement – only estimates the effects on
native English speakers in Catholic schools who were
exposed to an increase in white non-native speakers after
enlargement. Thus, the latter results cannot be
extrapolated to other contexts. 
But both strategies suggest that negative effects of non-
native English speakers can be ruled out. Thus, the
growing proportion of non-native English speakers in
primary schools should not be a cause for concern: this
trend is not detrimental to the educational attainment of
native English speakers.
This article summarises ‘Non-native Speakers of
English in the Classroom: What are the Effects on
Pupil Performance?’ by Charlotte Geay, Sandra
McNally and Shqiponja Telhaj, Centre for the
Study of the Economics of Education Discussion
Paper No. 137 (http://cee.lse.ac.uk/ceedps/
ceedp137.pdf). The research was funded 
by the Nuffield Foundation.
Charlotte Geay is at the Paris Graduate School 
of Economics, Statistics and Finance.
Sandra McNally is director of CEP’s research
programme on education and skills and professor
of economics at the University of Surrey.
Shqiponja Telhaj is a lecturer at the University
of Sussex and a research associate in CEP’s
education and skills programme.
Non-native English
speakers are more
likely to attend schools
with disadvantaged
native speakers
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he idea that people who are
responsible for creating a mess
should be charged for its
removal resonates with
common perceptions of fairness. But in
public policy-making, even before the
financial crisis, there are many examples of
this idea being turned on its head.
Climate change policy is one such area
– a problem inherently linked to the
realities of trying locally to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions that are
thoroughly global in their impact. Despite
many efforts to coordinate policies across
countries since the signing of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change 20 years ago, climate change
policy is still very much a localised affair.
So although some governments are
trying to reduce emissions, they also worry
about the possible negative effects of
pollution legislation on the competitiveness
of their countries or regions. In a globalised
economy, such concerns are not
unfounded as the dynamics of comparative
advantage are conducive to shifting
pollution-intensive production from
regulated to unregulated regions.
Regulated firms also have every
incentive to play up the risks to their
competitiveness even if there is no basis
for their claims. What’s worse is that
governments have little to go by in
evaluating such risks other than the
assessments of the regulated firms
themselves. And irrespective of any risks to
When governments design policies to reduce
firms’ greenhouse gas emissions, are they too
lenient on heavy polluters that claim such
measures will damage their ability to compete
in the global economy? Ralf Martin, Laure de
Preux and Ulrich Wagner assess the UK’s
experience with the climate change levy.
The polluter-
doesn’t-pay 
principle
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Figure 2:
Cost pass-through and non-European Union competition for
firms that pay the full climate change levy and those that
benefit from the tax discount
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Closure due to
climate policy likely
Some downsizing
No impact of
climate policy
=5
4
=3
2
=1
■  Firms benefiting from the discount
■  Firms paying the full levy
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Competition from
outside the EU
Cost pass-through
■  Firms benefiting from the discount
■  Firms paying the full levy
Figure 1:
The distribution of the downsizing risk scores for
firms that pay the full climate change levy and those
that benefit from the tax discount
firms’ ability to compete against their
counterparts in less regulated places, it is
the biggest emitters who have the biggest
incentives and deepest pockets to lobby
against any regulations.
Hence, it does not seem far-fetched to
consider the hypothesis that risk-averse
politicians are often unnecessarily timid in
imposing climate change regulations and
are likely to adopt a more lenient
approach than would be desirable.
To examine this hypothesis, we have
looked at the effects of the UK’s climate
change levy, an energy tax introduced by
the UK government in 2001 supposedly to
give firms an incentive to reduce their
energy consumption and thereby their
greenhouse gas emissions. In parallel,
motivated by concerns about
competitiveness, the government granted a
significant discount – initially 80% and later
reduced to 65% – from the tax to a large
number of industrial sectors whose
competitiveness was presumed to be at risk. 
But eligibility for the discount scheme
was not based on an analysis of how
exposed firms were to international
competition. Rather – primarily for legal
reasons – eligibility was given to firms with
polluting processes that were regulated
under legislation passed prior to 2001
known as ‘pollution prevention and
control’ (PPC).
The fact that emitters of conventional
pollutants are the ones benefiting from
the tax discount might not have been a
problem of course if there were a strong
overlap between the PPC-regulated firms
and those potentially threatened by
Firms that enjoy
a discount from
the climate
change levy do
not face higher
risks to their
competitiveness
international competition. That is a
question that our research has been able
to investigate.
Using the management interview
approach developed at CEP (Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2007), we conducted
interviews with managers in almost 200
UK manufacturing firms to gather
information on many aspects of firm
behaviour related to climate change
issues. The interviews were conducted as
part of a larger survey of 800 firms in six
European countries (Martin et al, 2011;
Martin et al, 2012; Anderson et al, 2011).
On the basis of the survey, we
constructed a number of firm-level scores.
Figures 1 and 2 report statistics on scores
that are indicative of whether a firm’s
competitiveness is at risk due to climate
change policies.
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Figure 1 displays a score that is directly
based on asking managers if they expect
that their firms will downsize or indeed
exit the UK (and Europe) due to climate
change policies during the next 10 years.
We see very little difference between firms
that benefit from the tax discount
compared with those that do not. 
The same conclusion emerges when
looking at the extent to which managers
believe that they can pass on cost increases
from the tax to customers in the form of
higher prices (‘cost pass-through’) or when
considering the share of foreign non-
European Union competitors that a firm
has (see Figure 2). If the competitiveness of
firms eligible for the discount is at risk, we
should see that they have lower cost pass-
through rates, a higher share of overseas
competitors or both.
Hence, the government’s way of
identifying firms whose competitiveness is
at risk seems to be solidly off target. While
this is deplorable from a policy point of
view, it opens up a unique opportunity for
researchers to examine if an energy tax
such as the climate change levy has the
negative impact that industry lobby 
groups claim.
Figure 1 indicates that roughly two in
five managers report that climate change
policy may have a negative impact on their
firm to the extent that they expect to
downsize or completely close down. But it
is striking that these firms are fairly equally
distributed between those that pay the full
climate change levy and those that benefit
from the tax discount.
A comparison of what happened to
firms in the two categories following the
2001 introduction of the climate change
levy should thus give us a good idea of
the effects of such an energy tax. We turn
to this next. 
Figure 3 reports the average 
difference in growth rates of various firm-
level outcomes between firms that are
eligible for the tax discount and those
paying the full levy before and after 2001
(Martin et al, 2009). We see that the
growth rate of employment as well as
output in firms that were not eligible for
the tax discount was on average more
than two percentage points higher than in
eligible firms. 
Similarly, there is no significant
difference in terms of productivity. In
further analysis, we have confirmed that
there is no significant difference in plant
exit either. If there were any impact on
competitiveness, we would expect that
Figure 3:
Growth rate differential between firms that pay the
full climate change levy and those that benefit from
the tax discount
-8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4%
Electricity consumption
Energy expenditure over revenue
(Multifactor) productivity
Output
Employment
Note: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Office for National Statistics.
Firms that pay
the full climate
change levy
reduce their
energy use and
their emissions
by more than
those that get a
tax discount
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Ralf Martin, an assistant professor at
Imperial College Business School, is a senior
visiting research fellow at CEP. Laure de
Preux is a research officer in CEP’s
programmes on productivity and innovation
and wellbeing. Ulrich Wagner, an assistant
professor at Carlos III University in Madrid,
is a research associate in CEP’s productivity
and innovation programme.
By granting discounts, the
government is missing out on tax
revenues and achieving less in
reducing emissions
firms without the tax discount would be
contracting faster and would be more
likely to exit.
We also repeated this analysis for
different sub-samples in our data, for
example, focusing on more energy-
intensive firms, which might be expected
to be more at risk. Again we find no
evidence of negative effects on
competiveness.
In contrast, we do find significant
differences when looking at the growth
rate of firms’ energy consumption,
which is the target of a tax such as the
climate change levy. Our results suggest
that firms paying the levy in full reduce
energy consumption at a rate more than
5% higher than firms benefiting from
the discount (see Figure 3).
What are the implications of our
results? First, there is no evidence that
firms with the tax discount are facing
higher risks to their competitiveness than
firms that pay the full climate change
levy. Moreover, we cannot find any
evidence for negative effects on
competitiveness. Not only does this
suggest that the current system of
granting discounts is badly targeted 
but also that there is no justification for
the discount.
Second, firms that pay the full tax
reduce their energy use and thereby
their greenhouse gas emissions by more
than beneficiaries from the discount.
Thus, by granting discounts, the
government is losing out twice: first, by
missing out on tax revenues in the order
of £350 million a year; and second, by
achieving less in terms of reaching its
targets on reducing emissions.
It would seem to be a no-brainer 
to abolish the discount and use the
revenue in continuing efforts to plug the
budget deficit. Alternatively, the extra
revenue could be recycled back to firms
via lower national insurance
contributions, as has been the practice
with much of the revenue from the
climate change levy to date.
But the UK government has 
reached a different conclusion. 
Although the discount scheme was
supposed to run out in April 2013, the
government has recently decided to
extend it until at least 2020. It is
currently finalising the details of the
legislation to bring it before parliament
in September this year.
Further reading
Barry Anderson, Jorg Leib, Ralf Martin, Marty
McGuigan, Mirabelle Muûls, Laure de Preux
and Ulrich Wagner (2011) ‘Climate Change
and Business in Europe: Evidence from
Interviewing Managers’, CEP Occasional
Paper No. 27 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/occasional/op027.pdf).
Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen (2007)
‘Measuring and Explaining Management
Practices Across Firms and Countries’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4).
Ralf Martin, Laure de Preux and Ulrich
Wagner (2009) ‘The Impacts of the Climate
Change Levy on Manufacturing: Evidence
from Microdata’, CEP Discussion Paper No.
917 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0917.pdf).
Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls and Ulrich
Wagner (2011) ‘Climate Change, Investment
and Carbon Markets and Prices – Evidence
from Manager Interviews’, Climate
Strategies.
Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls, Laure de Preux
and Ulrich Wagner (2012) ‘Industry
Compensation and Relocation Risk:
A Firm-level Analysis of the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme’, forthcoming CEP
Discussion Paper.
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The Great Recession has brought industrial policy back
into fashion. Governments around the world have 
given huge subsidies to private firms, most dramatically 
in financial services but also in other sectors such as the
car industry. 
But business support policies are not new. Most
governments grant investment subsidies that claim to
foster employment and productivity, particularly in
disadvantaged areas. In 2010, European Union (EU)
countries spent €61 billion on aid that was unrelated to
the financial crisis; and the United States spends around
$40-50 billion each year on local development policies.
Despite the ubiquity and cost of such schemes, rigorous
evaluations of the effects of these ‘industrial policies’ on
employment and productivity are rare. That is what we
have done in an analysis of the impact of expenditure
through Britain’s ‘regional selective assistance’ (RSA)
programme over a 20-year period.
We have examined every manufacturing plant in England,
Wales and Scotland – over 2.3 million observations –
comparing firms that did and did not get grants both
before and after receiving government support. 
Because EU law changed over this 20-year period, some
parts of Britain became eligible for subsidies and 
others saw their grants disappear, which makes it possible
for us to work out the impact of investment subsidies on
firm performance.
Our research suggests that government grants to 
smaller firms in economically disadvantaged areas of
Britain can increase employment, but that grants to larger
firms have no effect. The positive impacts on smaller
firms translate into wider area benefits, for example,
reduced unemployment.
But the resulting increases in local manufacturing
employment and reductions in unemployment come at a
cost in terms of productivity. Specifically, because RSA
grants support employment in lower productivity firms
while having no impact on firm-level productivity, RSA
lowers aggregate productivity by increasing the
employment share of low productivity firms.
Our findings suggest a large effect of grants on small
recipient firms: a 10% investment subsidy causes about a
7% increase in employment, with about half of this
(3.6%) arising from growth in existing firms and half
from firm entry. These effects are underestimated if
analysis ignores the fact that the participants in the
scheme are firms and areas that would otherwise perform
badly.
So why are these positive employment effects confined to
smaller firms, those with fewer than 150 workers? One
possible explanation is that larger firms are more able to
‘game’ the system and take the subsidy without changing
their investment and employment levels. Another possible
explanation is that grants help to remove the financial
constraints faced by smaller firms.
The wider impacts on employment and unemployment at
the area level suggest that positive effects at the firm
level are not just about shuffling jobs from nearby
firms that do not receive financial
support. In fact, the new jobs created
appear to come mostly from the pool
of unemployed workers in the area. 
Can industrial policy boost jobs?
Business support policies aimed at revitalising economically disadvantaged regions
can be effective at raising employment, according to a team of CEP researchers. But
government subsidies, such as Britain’s ‘grant for business investment’, only seem
to work when targeted at smaller firms.
in brief...
Grants to smaller firms can boost
jobs but grants to larger firms are
a waste of taxpayer money
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So grants to firms in disadvantaged areas can support
local employment. The policy is not costless, however,
considering the negative effect on productivity.
Overall, then, our results are mixed news for advocates of
firm-level grants to turn around disadvantaged areas.
While these policies can increase area-level employment,
they lower productivity, leaving firms vulnerable in the
future (which may partly explain why firms and areas
keep coming back for more support).
As always with these types of policies, careful economic
analysis suggests that there is no ‘free lunch’: firm grants
can raise employment, but at a cost in terms of
productivity that goes beyond the purely financial
implications of supporting investment in the first place.
This article summarises ‘The Causal Effects of an
Industrial Policy’ by Chiara Criscuolo, Ralf
Martin, Henry Overman and John Van Reenen,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 1113
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1113.pdf).
Chiara Criscuolo is a research associate in CEP’s
productivity and innovation programme.
Ralf Martin, an assistant professor at Imperial
College Business School, is a senior visiting
research fellow at CEP. Henry Overman is
director of the Spatial Economics Research
Centre. John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
Grants increase area-level 
employment but lower 
productivity, leaving firms 
potentially vulnerable 
in the future
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Do natural resource windfalls increase the
risk of armed conflict within a country? 
Yu-Hsiang Lei and Guy Michaels
investigate the impact of giant oilfield
discoveries on the likelihood of civil conflict.
Giant oilfields
and 
civil conflict
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A
necdotal evidence from
Angola, Iraq and Nigeria
suggests that discoveries
of natural resource
wealth in a country can
make civil conflict more likely. What’s
more, recent research (for example, Besley
and Persson, 2011) has shed light on the
mechanisms underlying some of these
conflicts over resources. But as the
examples of Brazil, Canada and Norway
demonstrate, not all oil-rich countries
experience internal conflicts.
Careful surveys of research on
conflicts and natural resources (for
example, Ross, 2006, and Blattman and
Miguel, 2010) show how difficult it has
been to quantify the effect of oil on
armed conflict in all but a handful of
countries. The goal of our research is to
examine whether giant oilfield discoveries
really do fuel internal armed conflicts
around the world – and if so, in 
which settings.
To investigate this question, we would
ideally want oil windfalls to appear as if in
a randomised controlled trial. But in reality,
of course, oil-rich countries differ from 
oil-scarce ones in ways that are difficult to
observe and measure. Using data over
time to control for fixed differences across
countries is not straightforward either,
because both the amount of oil extracted
and its price may themselves respond 
to conflict.
To overcome this challenge, we focus
on the discovery of giant oilfields (and
natural gas reserves) since the Second
World War, each of which contained
recoverable reserves of 500 million barrels
equivalent or more before extraction
began. As we discuss below, we find
evidence that the timing of these
discoveries is largely down to chance, so we
can interpret the events that follow them as
the causal effects of the discoveries.
Our first finding is that, on average, oil
production increases by about 35-50%
within a few years of a giant discovery.
Giant oilfield discoveries also increase oil
exports by about 20-50% within just a
few years (see Figure 1).
We also find that, on average, giant
oilfield discoveries increase the incidence
of internal armed conflicts by about 5-8
percentage points within four to eight
years of discovery, compared with a
baseline probability of about 10% 
(see Figure 2).
Figure 1:
The effect of giant oilfield discoveries
on per capita oil exports
Note: Point estimates in black and 95% confidence intervals in red.
60%
40%
20%
0
-20%
-40%
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
YEARS FROM DISCOVERY
Note: Point estimates in black and 95% confidence intervals in red.
15%
10%
5%
0
-5%
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 2:
The effect of giant oilfield discoveries on the
incidence of internal armed conflicts
YEARS FROM DISCOVERY
Giant oilfield
discoveries,
which are largely
down to chance,
significantly
increase the risk
of civil conflict
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The discovery of giant oilfields is
especially likely to fuel internal conflicts in
countries with recent histories of political
violence. For example, giant oilfield
discoveries increase the incidence of
internal armed conflict by about 11-18
percentage points (compared with a
baseline probability of about 37-39%)
when a country experienced at least one
such conflict in the decade prior to
discovery (see Figure 3). 
Similarly, the effect of discovery on the
incidence of internal armed conflict is 
11-14 percentage points (compared with a
baseline probability of about 19-20%) in
countries that experienced at least one
coup in the decade prior to discovery. By
contrast, in countries that experienced no
internal conflicts or coups in the decade
before a discovery, there is no significant
effect of giant oilfield discoveries on the
incidence of internal armed conflicts.
Turning to the effect of giant oilfield
discoveries on economic outcomes, we
find that GDP per capita and government
spending either increased modestly or
remained unchanged within the decade
following a giant oilfield discovery. Our
evidence also suggests that such
discoveries did not affect private
consumption or investment. In other
words, most residents gained little, if
anything, from the discoveries.
If we could be confident that the
timing of giant oilfield discoveries within
countries is random, then we could
interpret what follows them as the causal
effect of these discoveries. While we
recognise that the search effort is not
completely random, we argue that the
precise timing of discoveries within each
country is largely a matter of chance.
To see why, consider how important
giant oilfields are as a global source of oil
and natural gas. These giants account for
over 40% of the world’s oil and natural
gas reserves, so their discoveries are
economically significant events. If a
country or a firm could be fairly certain
that a search will turn up a giant oilfield,
then they will probably conduct the
search.
But in fact, giant oilfield discoveries
are very rare. Averaging across all
the countries in the world,
the odds of a giant
discovery in a given
year is less than
one-in-twenty. The
fact that these events are
so rare suggests that even when search
effort is involved, the precise timing is due
less to planning than to chance.
Our research provides additional
evidence that addresses some 
potential concerns about the timing 
of the discoveries, and supports our
interpretation that it is plausible to think
that timing is random. 
First, we address the concern that the
discoveries may have resulted from
economic or political changes that
preceded them. We find no evidence of
significant economic or political changes in
the five years leading up to giant oilfield
discoveries or in the year of discovery
itself. We also test whether discoveries
follow lulls in prior conflicts, and find no
evidence to support this hypothesis.
Second, we tackle the concern that
finding one giant oilfield may lead to
finding another one nearby. While it is
true that giant oilfield discoveries in a
Figure 3:
The effect of giant oilfield discoveries on the incidence 
of internal armed conflicts in countries with at least one
internal armed conflict in the previous decade
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country’s recent past increase the odds
that it finds one in a given year,
controlling for these past discoveries
leaves the findings essentially unchanged.
Our results are also robust to
excluding observations within a decade or
less of previous giant discoveries.
Observations with giant oilfield discoveries
account for only about 1% of the
remaining sample, making them especially
difficult to anticipate.
Third, we address concerns that
economic or political conditions shortly
before discovery may affect our estimates,
by showing that our results are robust to
controlling for institutional quality and
aggregate private investment.
Finally, we tackle the concern that
observations with oil discoveries are
different from others in ways that are
difficult to measure directly. To do so, we
compare the effect of giant oilfield
discoveries with the effect of smaller
oilfield discoveries, and find that our
results still hold.
Our finding that giant oilfield
discoveries fuel internal conflicts in
countries prone to violence has important
implications for policy. For example, those
who strive to reduce armed conflict should
be concerned about the windfalls from oil
that incumbent governments obtain in
conflict-prone areas, especially if those
windfalls encourage challenges to the
incumbent’s power. 
At the same time, the firms that
prospect for oil in conflict-prone areas and
those who regulate them ought to be
concerned about negative consequences
for many local people. Locals often have
little to gain from giant oilfield discoveries
but may suffer enormously from conflicts
over the oil.
In conflict-prone areas,
windfalls from oil
discoveries may well
encourage challenges 
to the incumbent
government’s power
This article summarises ‘Do Giant Oilfield
Discoveries Fuel Internal Armed Conflicts?’
by Yu-Hsiang Lei and Guy Michaels, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 1089
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp1089.pdf).
Yu-Hsiang Lei is an occasional research
assistant in CEP’s labour markets programme.
Guy Michaels is a lecturer in economics at
LSE and a research associate in CEP’s labour
markets programme.
Further reading
Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson (2011)
‘The Logic of Political Violence’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 126(3): 1411-45
Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel
(2010) ‘Civil War’, Journal of Economic
Literature 48(1): 3-57
Michael Ross (2006) ‘A Closer Look at Oil,
Diamonds, and Civil War’, Annual Review of
Political Science 9: 265-300
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Two cheers for Anglo-Saxon
financial markets?
The increasing dominance of pension funds, mutual
funds and other institutional owners in the US and UK
stock markets has been a positive force for industrial
innovation and growth over the past 30 years, according
to a recent study that I have conducted with Philippe
Aghion of Harvard and Luigi Zingales of Chicago.
Our research indicates that publicly traded companies in
which institutional investors have raised their equity stake
will increase their innovation. These large companies have
dispersed ownership so no individual has much of an
incentive to keep an eye on the chief executive officer (CEO). 
We suggest that the positive role of institutional investors
is because of their greater incentive and ability to monitor
companies’ performance. They can offer a kind of job
insurance to CEOs who are prepared to take a chance on
risky, but potentially rewarding, longer-term investments.
At a time when deregulated financial markets are under
attack from many quarters, it rare to hear any positive
words for some aspects of the Anglo-Saxon financial
model. Even before the financial crisis, the takeover of the
stock market by institutions – pension funds, hedge funds,
mutual funds and the like – was condemned for breeding
a bias against long-term investments in innovation.
Whereas Japanese and German research and development
(R&D) created better cars, it was said, British and
Americans specialised in producing better quick-fix
derivatives of no long-term value.
Our study takes a contrary position, arguing that the
rise in institutional ownership – from under 10% in the
1950s to over 60% today – has actually been a positive
force for innovation and growth. We look at publicly
traded US corporations that were responsible for the
bulk of private sector R&D over the past 40 years and
track what happens when institutions increase their
equity share.
Analysing data on the accounts and patenting activity of
803 publicly traded US firms from the mid-1970s to the
early 2000s, we find that a greater role for institutional
investors is followed by a burst of innovation in future
years as indicated by patents (weighted by citations to
reflect their importance), R&D and productivity.
This does not seem to be because institutions are better
at predicting future breakthroughs, as the burst of
innovation occurs even after events that increase
institutional investors’ role, such as policy changes
favouring investor activism and gaining membership of
the S&P 500 index of the US stock market (which boosts
institutional ownership).
We argue that institutions have a greater incentive to
monitor top managers than individual owners as they
typically have larger blocks of company shares. They also
have a better ability to monitor managers as they own
shares in many companies and know how to set up
better systems for keeping an eye on CEOs.
Institutional investors are good for industrial innovation, according to
a study by CEP’s director John Van Reenen and colleagues.
in brief...
Publicly traded
companies in which
institutions have
raised their equity
stake increase their
innovation
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Monitoring might improve incentives for innovation
because lazy managers are forced to put in more effort
rather than lazing around on the golf course or the ski
slopes of Davos. This would imply that the impact of
institutional investors is stronger when managers are
more entrenched due to weak competition or protection
from takeovers.
In fact, we find that the role of institutions is greater
when managers are less entrenched, so we prefer an
explanation based on ‘career concerns’. Innovation is a
risky business, so top managers fear that they will be
fired if they take a chance by investing in innovation and
things turn out badly through no fault of their own. 
By gathering more information on managerial quality,
institutions offer some insurance to CEOs who are
prepared to take a chance on risky, but rewarding,
investments.
One test of our career concerns theory is to look at CEO
firing. Poor profitability performance is often followed
with the abrupt booting out of the incumbent CEO. But
our research shows that decreases in profit – which may
not be the sole fault of the CEO – are less likely to cause
a firing when institutional investors are stronger. This is in
line with the view that institutions give some insurance
protection to managers and encourage them to take on
more risky innovation.
Since innovation is the engine of growth, the
institutional ownership that characterises the 
Anglo-American financial system clearly has long-run
benefits. These benefits should not be regulated away 
in the current backlash.
This article summarises ‘Innovation
and Institutional Ownership’ by
Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen 
and Luigi Zingales, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 911 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp0911.pdf) and
forthcoming in the American 
Economic Review.
Philippe Aghion is at Harvard
University. John Van Reenen is
director of CEP. Luigi Zingales is at
the University of Chicago.
Institutional investors
offer job insurance 
to CEOs who make
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Recent figures indicate a resurgence in the growth of
executive pay in the UK at a time of austerity for most.
Anger at these numbers is driven in part by a growing belief
that such pay bears little relationship to how the companies
managed by these chief executive officers (CEOs) actually
perform. In other words, the argument goes, there is pay
for no performance. 
To shed more light on whether there is any link between the
pay of top business people and the performance of their
firms, we have created a database of pay for CEOs, senior
executives and employees covering over 400 UK firms over
the period since 2001. These firms account for about 90%
of UK stock market capitalisation.
This is the first time that data covering everyone from the
CEO to the cleaners in a large sample of firms has been
collected and linked to stock market performance in this
country. It makes it possible to explore how pay changes
across a whole company as its performance improves or
worsens.
As might be expected, we find that there are big differences
in average pay. CEOs earn around 40 times more than 
the average employee, but this multiple rises to around 
80 when we look only at the very top companies – the FTSE
100. The majority of pay for CEOs comes from bonuses and
stock incentive plans, whereas 95% of employees’ pay
comes from basic salary.
Our evidence also shows that when corporate performance
improves, so does pay. But pay goes up much more for
CEOs than for ordinary employees. For example, if the firm’s
value as measured by shareholder returns increases by 10%,
CEOs on average get an extra 3% in pay while employees
get only 0.2% more.
This close pay-for-performance link among CEOs seems to
be a fairly new development. Evidence from the 1980s and
early 1990s found almost no link between pay and
performance for top executives. Our research shows that
today’s correlation between pay and performance is driven
by bonuses and other incentive packages, which have
become more important in recent years.
We also find that poorly performing firms are much more
likely to boot out their CEOs, and that when a firm does
badly, CEO pay goes down. But it is worth noting that CEO
pay cuts for failure are not as speedy as pay increases on
the upside. So although it is true that CEOs are not just
‘rewarded for failure’, they get more pleasure when the
company’s performance goes up than pain when
performance goes down.
Of course, these average effects of performance on pay
cover both well-governed firms that use pay to provide
incentives for their CEO and poorly performing firms that
pay over the odds for questionable talent.
Finally, we demonstrate that there is a strong relationship
between how tightly firms link CEO pay with performance
and how significant institutional investors are among the
firms’ shareholders. For firms with low levels of institutional
ownership, we find no link between pay and performance
in general, although CEOs in such firms do benefit when
performance is good.
In contrast, firms with high levels of institutional ownership
are more successful at linking pay and performance, and
ensuring that the link works in both good times and bad
times. This all suggests that active and large shareholders
can provide an important disciplining influence on the
structure of CEO pay.
What are the implications for policy? We think that there
are strong grounds for encouraging more transparent
reporting of pay by companies. Many annual reports are
unnecessarily complicated in their reporting of executive pay
and, perhaps inadvertently, tend to obscure the size and
nature of the pay awards.
We also think that there should be a requirement for each
and every board to explain to shareholders and the public
how the growth in pay of their CEO is linked to the
performance of the company. Those that fail this test must
be held to account by shareholders.
UK chief executives:
paid for performance?
Is there any clear relationship between corporate performance
and executive remuneration? To explore this question, Brian Bell
and John Van Reenen have created a new database of pay for
senior executives and employees in 400 UK firms.
in brief...
This article summarises ‘Firm Performance and Wages:
Evidence from across the Corporate Hierarchy’ by Brian Bell 
and John Van Reenen, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1088
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1088.pdf).
Brian Bell is a research fellow in CEP’s productivity and innovation
programme. John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
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